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Global Social Policy
Forum
Editor’s Introduction and Signing Off
This is the last issue of Global Social Policy (GSP) that I will be responsible for
as Editor of GSP. In fact this particular issue is guest edited by Gaby Ramia
whose more detailed editorial appears below. I will have edited five volumes
of the journal after founding it in 1999. I like to think that the journal is now
making a useful contribution to the study of global social policy under-
stood as the impact of global forces and processes on national level social
policy and as supranational social policies operating at regional and global
level. Whether the focus is social protection or education or health and social
care or any other aspect of social provision, the analysis of current problems
and policies is incomplete without an international dimension to the analysis
or policy prescription.
The journal grew out of the Globalism and Social Policy Programme
(GASPP, http://www.gaspp.org). GASPP is a Finnish funded programme
based at STAKES in Helsinki. Without the support of STAKES finances and
the collaboration of colleagues at STAKES this journal would not have come
into existence. I would like to express my appreciation for the support of
STAKES and in particular to its Director General Vappu Taipale for her faith
in our project.
After a public call to tender for the editorship the Editorial Advisory Board
of the journal, SAGE with my agreement have appointed to take over from
me for an initial five-year period a team of three joint editors. They are Meri
Koivusalo of STAKES Finland, Robert O’Brien of McMaster University,
Canada and Nicola Yeates of the Open University, England. I am delighted
to hand over the job to these excellent representatives of the next generation
of international social policy scholars.
Please from now on send all materials for the journal to gsp@mcmaster.ca.
In GSP 6.1 the new team will have an opportunity to set out their editorial
policy.
My final comment is to reassert that the journal was created not only to
further the understanding of the global dimension to social policy analysis but
also to contribute to more effective and just global social policies. In this
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context I want to record my appreciation for the willing collaboration with
GSP and GASPP of a large number of international civil servants who have
given of their time either as board members or as referees or in other ways
over the past few years. Those in the International Labour Organisation
(ILO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World
Health Organization (WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO) and World
Bank know who they are. I am aware that progressive global social policies
emerge out of the struggles of global social movements but their supporters
in international agencies play an often unsung part in this process.
Why Migration and Social Protection?
Guest Editor’s Introduction
In the scholarly analysis of social policy’s global and supranational dimen-
sions, the role of multilateral institutions in reshaping welfare and other forms
of social amelioration has been prominent. Indeed Global Social Policy (GSP)
springs from this very tradition (Deacon et al., 1997; Yeates, 2001). Within
the GSP tradition a research agenda on the implications of civil society in its
multiple life-forms has surfaced (Deacon, 2000; Ramia, 2003; Stubbs, 2003).
The under-theorized impact of privatization, corporations and other actors in
the market sector have also made an entrance (GSP 5.2; see also Farnsworth,
2004; Holden, 2003). All of these lenses on global social policy assume, and
have as a backdrop, ongoing globalization processes; infused and informed as
these are by foreign direct investment and cross-border and multilateral trade
in goods and services.
But what of the movement of people? Despite some focus on the (general-
ized) human rights dimensions of migration (e.g. Graham and Poku, 2000;
Weiner, 1995) the phenomenon of people-movement has received little
systematic attention from global social policy specialists. The domain of
migration studies has now had a long presence outside the field, but the
implications and consequences of migration for global social policy are in
need of greater scholarly consideration; not least because of the increasing
numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers, who are stateless non-citizens
(Castles and Miller, 2003: 102–9).
Beyond the concept of not belonging to a state, and thus not being afforded
the rights of national citizenship in its various forms (Marshall, 1963), the
social policy literature need not be searched long and wide to witness that the
social and other rights of citizenship have been based mainly on and within
the nation-state. Even when this is the case, the phenomenon of intra-
national migration, typically rural-to-urban and in the developing nation
setting, presents significant complications to contemporary understandings of
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citizenship. The supranational aspects of migrant social rights are still in dire
need of explication.
The purpose of this Focused Issue of GSP is to contribute to the analysis of
social protection rights among both international and intra-national migrants
in the context of global people-movement. In keeping with existing under-
standings of globalization, the phenomenon of globality of flows in capital
and goods and services is assumed. In addition, however, the authors consider
people-flows, placing a microscope on the common slippages in rights of
individuals who relocate for whatever reason. Analysis also focuses on their
communities and social networks. The articles in the issue respond to the
dearth of research in the area, providing case studies that highlight the global,
supranational and national policy and governance issues raised for global
social policy analysts. Emergent problems with public policy regimes are
explored, alongside discussions of the issues raised by these problems for the
state, market and civil society sectors; and for coordination between them.
In the first article, Nyland and Nyland explore the movement of ideas in the
policy and practice of early childhood education: from Italy, via the USA, into
China. The authors utilize a case study of a mixed-funded, Chinese–US
partnership project in child adoption based on the ‘Reggio Emilia model’,
arguing that China is relying too much on non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to service the needs of its child citizens and that ideas can be ‘lost in
translation’ as they are transported across regions and nations.
The movement of people within the nation is also strongly characteristic of
economic and social development of countries like China. In the second
article, however, Deumert et al. analyse rural-to-urban migration in South
Africa, exploring in particular the ways in which migrants seek to have their
needs met as they move into large cities. Survey data from migrants in four
low-income areas in Cape Town is utilized, focusing on employment, life in
the urban environment, the impact of language background and proficiency,
and migrant access to formal and informal sources of protection against the
market. The authors argue that language rights, particularly to English and
Afrikaans, and access to informal but strong-tie social networks emerge as the
most important variables, and that developing states need to design social
policies for migrants with these factors in mind.
In the third article, Deumert et al. explore the rights of cross-border
students in the context of the increasingly globalized market for higher
education, with a focus on Australia, the third largest market in the world for
international education. The authors find that the traditional institutions of
social protection are largely ineffective in servicing student needs, given that
cross-border students are treated as consumers and not human beings in their
host country, and that legally and politically they are only temporary visa
holders rather than citizens. It is argued that a regime embodying ‘social and
economic security’ is superior to one based on social protection, calling for
more integrated governance with streamlining between formal state and
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market institutions and civil society organizations at the national, supra-
national and global levels.
In some countries some migrants can have greater access to social rights
than others. In the fourth and final article, Nielsen et al. move attention back
to within-nation migration, focusing on China. Using data from a survey of
internal migrants in the province of Jiangsu, the authors shed light on the
characteristics of migrant workers who are able to access social insurance
schemes, explaining why some are given insurance while some are not. They
argue that, of the many factors which explain this phenomenon, the most
significant are gender, the ownership structure of the enterprise in which
workers are employed, and urban as opposed to rural residential registration
status. Seen in this light, Nielsen and her collaborators argue, the optimism
expressed by some regarding the diffusion of social rights under urbanization
are not founded.
The four articles were first presented at a Workshop on ‘Global People
Movement and the Social Protection Needs of Migrants’. This was a
Workshop of the Ninth International Metropolis Conference in Geneva, 27
September–1 October 2004. The theme of the conference was ‘Co-operative
Migration Management: International, National and Local Answers’.
In addition to the articles, the issue contains two short Forum pieces. The
first, by Nicola Yeates, discusses the potential role of the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in
extending social security for temporary migrant workers. The second reviews
key social protection issues stemming from the global movement of labour,
with a focus on the role of labour movements, the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) and the Global Commission on International Migration
(GCIM).
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N I C O L A  Y E AT E S
Open University, UK
Extending Social Security for Temporary Migrant Workers:
What Role for the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)?
(nicola yeates is Senior Lecturer in the faculty of Social Sciences, Open University,
Milton Keynes, UK)
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) has acquired certain notoriety within global social policy
mainly because of its potentially far-reaching implications for the develop-
ment of public health and welfare services. Most critical attention in this
regard has focused on the restrictions the GATS places on governments in
setting and pursuing public policy objectives specifically its potential to lever
an enhanced role for commercial providers in the delivery of welfare services.
There is, however, an alternative reading of GATS that emphasizes the pos-
sibilities it affords to lever improvements in temporary migrant workers’
access to social security benefits.
One issue facing temporary migrant workers is that they are often required
to pay social security contributions without a corresponding entitlement to
receive benefits due to minimum contribution periods that exceed the period
over which they pay contributions and/or the requirement that claimants be
permanent residents of the country to receive benefits. In some cases migrant
temporary workers will be ‘taxed’ twice, paying social security contributions
at home as well as abroad. These and other social security ‘losses’ often are
greatest for immigrants from developing countries which are less likely to be
party to totalization agreements permitting their nationals to receive benefits
based on their combined employment history whether at home or abroad
(Desai et al., 2000).
It might seem somewhat improbable to contemplate the GATS as a
significant feature of a global regime governing the social protection rights of
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migrant workers. Arguably though, GATS has the potential to become
precisely that, subject to an expansive reading of current provisions.
Although GATS does not in principle apply to measures affecting access to
the employment market of a Member or to measures regarding citizenship,
residence or employment on a permanent basis (Annex on the Movement of
Natural Persons), Grynberg (2001) points out that GATS applies to measures
affecting ‘natural persons’ who are ‘service suppliers of a Member’ and to
‘natural persons of a Member who are employed by a service supplier of a
Member in respect of the supply of a service’. Thus, Grynburg argues, while
it is clear that foreign nationals working as unattached (self-employed) service
providers or employees of a foreign company are covered by the GATS, it is
not clear that unattached foreign nationals offering their labour services to a
domestic firm providing services domestically are excluded from the GATS
(see also Winters et al., 2002). An expansive interpretation of GATS Mode 4
(Movement of Natural Persons) provisions would enable governments to
schedule commitments relating to lower- and medium-skilled workers
emigrating on a temporary basis to provide a commercial service as an
employee (Mode 4 commitments are currently restricted to higher-level and
skilled personnel, notably professionals and specialists, whose mobility is
directly related to foreign direct investment).
Not only would this be consistent with the GATS’ aim of progressing the
liberalization of trade in (labour) services, it would solidify the intersection of
the WTO/GATS with employment and social security regimes, increasing
pressure to ensure that social security provisions for temporary migrant
workers are GATS-consistent. This would entail addressing inequities in
social security arrangements for temporary foreign workers, ensuring that
they have access to and use of the same range of benefits as ‘like’ suppliers (in
this case, nationals employed as temporary workers) (National Treatment
principle) and eliminating social security measures that discriminate between
‘like’ foreign nationals (Most Favoured Nation principle).
‘GATS-proofing’ social security could be achieved by ‘levelling up’
(introducing new entitlements or making existing ones more generous) or by
‘levelling down’ (aligning entitlements to the level of the least generous
provision). Either way, the application of these principles would have pro-
found implications for national regimes not least because access to benefits so
often depends on permanent residence. Assuming that residency rules remain
fundamentally unchanged, a number of Policy options that effect these
principles can be identified. One option is to distinguish between short-term
and long-term social security programmes in order to permit temporary
workers to access at least some coverage during their period in the host
country, as suggested by Winters et al. (2002). Reducing ‘excessive’ labour
taxes on foreign temporary workers could entail exempting them from paying
social security contributions in the host country or allowing them to pay their
home country rates to take account of the differences in labour costs between
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foreign and domestic labour (Winters et al., 2002). Alternatively, the contri-
butions made by temporary workers in their host country could be
‘repatriated’ to their country of origin in the form of an intergovernmental
social security transfer.
Perhaps a more ambitious option is to use the GATS to extend more
favourable treatment to nationals of Members not already party to total-
ization agreements. Traditionally, totalization agreements are negotiated on a
bi-lateral basis and more rarely on a regional basis (as in the EU), but in
theory social security measures could be made subject to the Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) rule instituting the multilateral elimination of discrimination
between foreign nationals by all WTO Members. While this could lead to the
extension of social security coverage worldwide for this group of migrant
workers, it would undoubtedly pose numerous difficulties.
Totalization agreements require a certain degree of compatibility between
the social security systems of the countries concerned and the specific terms
of agreements reflect the circumstances of the participating countries. It
would also be difficult to determine which Member provides the most
favourable treatment. Given the difficulties of multilateralizing totalization
agreements, Members could table an MFN exemption for social security and
promote the conclusion of more bi-lateral social security agreements between
Members. Article VII provides for the negotiation of mutual recognition
agreements between Members and permits others to negotiate accession to
any agreement concluded. Extending worldwide mutual recognition in social
security could provide the basis for reducing ‘excessive’ labour taxes on
foreign temporary workers and extending coverage for this group.
Of course, this would do little in itself to address issues of inequity in access
to, and use of, social security resulting from factors other than those relating
to national origin (that is, gender, urban/rural, ethnicity; absence of or
incomplete coverage nationally). Neither would it address the lack of social
security coverage for migrants working in the informal economy. Nor would
it necessarily prohibit the re-inscription of discrimination on grounds of
national origin in social security. It would also probably face political
objections by supporters and detractors of the present WTO/GATS regime
either not wishing to complicate already complex and contentious trade
liberalization negotiations, or detract from broader reforms to the WTO
trade regime or from the need to abolish it entirely, or extend the
‘encroachment’ of the GATS in the public services field.
In addition it may be resisted by governments objecting to the development
of supranational binding rules that materially affect national social security
policy autonomy. After all, EU member governments, which, by worldwide
standards, a relatively coherent political bloc, have fiercely resisted the
European Commission’s aspiration to make social security a supranational
project. Finally, there may be more specific objections to extending social
security entitlements to foreign nationals.
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It is important to point out that any ensuing political divisions would not be
reducible to a conflict between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, even
though the Indian government has so far been the most vocal on the
international trade implications of unequal access to social security by
individual ‘service suppliers’ temporarily working in ‘developed’ countries.
Although some commentators (Desai et al., 2000) indicate that the losses of
social security payments are greatest for immigrants from developing
countries, long vesting periods are more often found in social security
schemes in ‘developing’ and ‘newly industrialized’ countries themselves than
in ‘developed’ countries. Thus, opposition to a GATS-induced policy to grant
foreign temporary workers better social security entitlements may come from
‘developing’ and newly industrialized countries that employ many foreign
workers. For example, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab
Emirates, all of whom rely heavily on immigrant labour, only grant foreign
workers employment injury protection and deny them public pensions
(Gillion et al., 2000: 548). Opposition to the extension of the GATS rules into
the social security area may also come from private financial services
providers, which are otherwise major supporters of GATS because of the
‘new’ market opportunities they believe it would open to them. For example,
private providers of mandatory pension insurance may voice objections if the
extension of the GATS to social security means allowing foreign competition
for pension fund capital.
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S H A R A N  B U R R O W
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Belgium
The Economic Case for Migration and the Protection of Mobile
Workers: Challenges for the International Labour Movement
(SHARAN BURROW is President, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
Belgium. Member, Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation
Commissioner, Global Commission on International Migration)
AN ABRIDGED AND UPDATED VERSION OF A PLENARY SPEECH
DELIVERED TO THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE,
2004
Migration is not a new phenomenon – indeed much of the globe as we know
it has been shaped by the migration of peoples for centuries. Yet today we have
greater interconnectedness than at any other time in our history. The
Director General of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has
summed up the core issue presented by migration succinctly when he stated
that the greatest structural deficit of globalization is the failure to create jobs
where people live.
This failure drives two realities, both key issues for the ILO:
1. The imperative to create and sustain decent work in all countries of the
globe, and
2. To manage the movement of people in order to create greater prosperity
for all.
I shall focus on the second of these.
In migration discussion there is an economic dimension, and a human
rights imperative. Solutions that enable effective and just outcomes for
government, employers and workers will be constructed on the foundations
of the core mandate of the ILO – labour rights and standards.
The magnitude of migration is significant and increasing. Some 86m
migrant workers are estimated to be economically active globally, with 34m in
developing regions. The ILO estimates that in total there are some 175m
people residing outside their countries of birth or citizenship. Indeed as the
Director General of the ILO reminded us recently, together they would
constitute the fifth most populous nation on the globe.
This is not a north–south issue. About 40% of all migration occurs between
one developing country and another, and through large cross-border
movements of workers among neighbouring countries in the developing
regions.
Yet despite the urgency of the challenges we face, it is salutary to remember
that there is sometimes a tendency to overestimate the magnitude of migra-
tion in the receiving countries. By the late 1990s migration still represented
no more than 4.2% of the industrialized countries’ total workforce. Foreign
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born persons now account for about 10% of the total population in the USA,
17% in Canada and 24% in Australia. By comparison foreign born persons
comprise only about 5% of the population in Europe and 1% in Japan.
The most vulnerable situations of migrant workers are those with irregular
status because of the kind of work they do and the absence of national law
protecting them. The ILO estimates that about 15% of all migrants are in
irregular situations and the bald economic fact is that many communities
would cease to function if their labour was withdrawn – many employers
would go out of business.
An increasing proportion of migration for employment is temporary. As
Yeates makes clear in her Forum piece in this issue, the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4 negotiations in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are expected to accelerate this trend. Many developing
countries have made the rapid expansion of GATS Mode 4 to cover semi-
skilled and unskilled workers a major priority. This will continue to cause
tension for national governments as employers increasingly call for temporary
workers to cover labour shortages and trade unions oppose these proposals in
the face of just concern that the WTO rules provide no protection of worker
rights and hence the body has no tools to resolve the need for equal treatment
of temporary migrant workers.
Beyond the historic factors driving migration, including oppression,
conflict, famine and dire poverty, there is the reality of demographic changes
and ageing populations in industrialized countries. I note that because of
ageing populations the number of employed people in the EU, for example,
will decline by 20m workers between 2010 and 2030. This will place
continued economic growth at risk and increase the pressures on the
financing of the welfare system in industrialized countries. Migration can help
alleviate these pressures.
In Australia the business community and the unions have begun to act in
partnership to resolve the impending threat of a shrinking labour force.
Increased migration is certainly part of the answer. When the economic
benefits for both sending and receiving countries are considered, increased
migration through regular and well-managed procedures is critical.
In addition to the challenge of ageing populations the main benefits to
receiving countries come through increased aggregate demand and the
increased size of the domestic market, which enables employers to benefit
from economies of scale without having to focus excessively on export
markets. Larger domestic markets – established through migration – make
the economic arguments for excessive trade liberalization and open capital
markets less compelling. My own country, Australia, would not be the rich
nation it is today without immigration. Indeed we are a land of immigrants.
The intake of migrant workers this year will result in a small net gain to our
GDP but by the end of a decade, increased migration will add a staggering
3–4% to GDP growth in Australia.
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The economic impact on sending countries is increasingly dramatic.
Reduced labour supply in countries where the jobs do not exist can reduce
labour market pressure and put upward pressure on wages and working con-
ditions offering greater security and dignity for working families. Remittances
from family members working in other countries are another important way
in which migration promotes growth and reduces poverty in developing
countries. The positive impact of remittances on consumption and investment
expenditure in many developing countries is obvious. In 2001 workers’ remit-
tances to developing countries totalled 72bn dollars, exceeding Official
Development Assistance (ODA) flows to developing countries and consti-
tuting over 40% of total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. Remittances
are particularly important for the very poorest countries and, unlike FDI, are a
relatively stable source of hard currency. This is not to deny that there are
some social consequences that concern both Government and unions.
Remittances are private financial flows from workers to their families or
other private beneficiaries. They can have a significant impact on the distri-
bution of income in developing countries. They are used by some worker
families to buy basic goods in local markets, send kids to school and pay for
health care. Often remittances are used by middle income families to
construct or renovate homes. These construction activities have significant
multiplier effects on the domestic economy. Remittances also provide finance
to poor families that would not otherwise have access to credit, to establish
their own micro business. Remittances thus provide an important means of
helping transform and mainstream the informal economy.
Hard currency is required if a developing country is to purchase the inputs
and technology that are necessary for establishing a larger manufacturing and
service based industry structure. Remittances are therefore an important ele-
ment in reducing poverty and promoting a diversified development strategy
for the poorest countries. In the absence of remittances, developing countries
would be required to attract hard currency through other mechanisms. Either
relying on further international loans or further pursuit of the undesirable
polices currently used to attract private FDI: labour market deregulation; low
domestic wages; fiscal restraint; and privatization – these are strategies largely
opposed by trade unions because of their disastrous impact on the lives of wor-
kers and their families and policies increasingly recognized as unsustainable.
I note that the economic benefits of remittances are currently reduced
through high transaction costs, with up to 20% of remittance values being lost
in transactions costs imposed by banks. This is profiteering and an ugly side
of globalization that must be exposed and eradicated.
What of the economic benefits to sending countries through return migra-
tion and the diaspora effect? Apart from trade links and the circular transfer
of skills and technology, expatriates are increasingly a significant source of
FDI. In China alone some $60bn (US dollars) of FDI came from Chinese
people living abroad.
GSP Forum 277
This is not to deny that there are some social consequences that concern
both government and unions. The main economic cost of migration for
sending countries is brain drain. The migration of well-educated and high
skilled workers from developing countries to industrialized countries has been
increasing since the early 1990s. Health care and education in a number of
countries has been strongly affected by the departure of trained doctors and
nurses.
To offset the economic impact of brain drain international cooperation is
required to compensate developing countries for the cost of educating skilled
workers who migrate. This could be financed by returning a proportion of
taxes paid by migrant workers to their home countries.
But just as the international labour movement may take the lead in advo-
cating the positive economic case, we would implore the employers to join
with us and support the need to eliminate worker rights abuses that are too
often associated with the employment of migrant labour. Without decent
work and equal treatment of migrant workers the profits of employers are at
best short term and the potential costs of social disharmony will only serve to
threaten the sustainability of their enterprises. For governments, the eco-
nomic case for migration is hollow without the protection of people. The
political consequences of failing to address the human rights dimension of
migration are clear.
Therefore we cannot overlook human rights abuses, or the often significant
social costs for families that decide to send one member abroad to work.
Clearly, this involves major sacrifices and hardships. The impacts of the
feminization of migration are dramatic, given that women now account for
half of all migrant workers. Women migrants face particular risks of sexual
abuse and violence as well as family dislocation; and they are primarily the
victims of the evil underbelly of inadequate management systems for the
movement of people – trafficking.
I will not labour the question of human rights but let me state emphatically
that for trade unions human rights and labour rights go hand in hand, and I
would like to be assured that this is also a given for employers and govern-
ments as we map a better future. In this context we must not walk away from
the responsibility we share to determine a way forward.
In closing, can I first alleviate the fears I have heard from a few governments
regarding state sovereignty; and second provide a 2005 postscript on civil
society and intergovernmental activities in the management of international
migration and in particular labour migration.
To the first point: labour movements do not seek to interfere in the
sovereign rights of states. While as citizens of our individual countries we may
well seek to influence government, the public policy decisions about who
comes to live and work in a nation and in what numbers is the responsibility
of governments. However, to the extent that migrant workers are invited into
a nation or to the extent that migrants live and/or work in a nation due to
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cross-border flows of people, then we seek to build on the tools of the ILO
and work with our social partner to identify pressing issues, map best practice
guidelines and build a multilateral framework. The framework, while not
binding, should carry the authority of workable solutions to strengthen our
economies, build social cohesion and eliminate the corruption enabled by the
gaps in the contemporary framework of global regulation.
To the second: the work of the Governing Body of the ILO on developing
a non-binding rights-based framework of best practice for managing labour
migration is to be considered further through an Experts Meeting in
December 2005. In a separate but related forum, the Global Commission on
International Migration (GCIM), mandated by UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, is to report, also in 2005. This will follow current consultations in all
regions of the world, which consider issues for national, regional and global
governance.
Migration divides governments and people otherwise committed to pro-
gressive social and economic policies; and yet it is at the very heart of the
challenge of a just globalization. Working towards meeting this challenge is
imperative for governments, employers and workers.
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